Grand Tamasha

Prashant Jha on Why We Missed the Modi Wave

Episode Summary

Many election analysts, journalists, and political scientists failed to predict the massive mandate that Prime Minister Narendra Modi claimed in the 2019 general election. Prashant Jha—who was one of the few who picked up on the pro-Modi wave during the campaign—explains why so many election observers missed the writing on the wall.

Episode Notes

Milan speaks with Prashant Jha, opinion editor at the Hindustan Times and author of the book, How the BJP Wins: Inside India’s Greatest Election Machine. So many election analysts, journalists, and political scientists failed to predict the massive mandate that Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) claimed in the 2019 general election. This has prompted a good deal of soul-searching as to why. In this conversation, Prashant—who was one of the few who picked up on the pro-Modi wave during the campaign—explains why so many election observers missed the writing on the wall.

Milan also speaks with Prashant about the current state of the BJP, the induction of BJP president Amit Shah into the government, what ails the Congress Party, and what could upset the BJP’s current electoral dominance.

 

Episode Transcription

Intro: 00:00 "Unabashed" "The most unpredictable" "becomes a headline." "The most volatile" "outrageous behavior." “Unsubstantiated narratives" "A battle of personalities."

Milan Vaishnav: 00:12 Welcome to Grand Tamasha. I'm your host Milan Vaishnav, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The 2019 Indian elections have come and gone, but there's still one lingering question that many election watchers are still asking. Why did we miss the Modi the wave? Although many election analysts, journalists, political scientists, suspected that the BJP would come back to power in the spring of 2019 many if not most failed to predict the massive mandate that Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the BJP eventually won. Over the summer. I sat down with Prashant Jhaopinion editor of the Hindustan Times and author of the book "How the BJP Wins: Inside India's Greatest Election Machine." Prashant is one of the few who picked up on the pro-Modi wave during the campaign and he and I discussed why so many election observers missed the writing on the wall. Here's our conversation from the Hindustan Times studio in New Delhi.

Milan Vaishnav: 01:00 Prashant, nice to have you on the show.

Prashant Jha: 01:01 Thank you, Milan, good to be here.

Milan Vaishnav: 01:03 In August 2017, you published a book entitled "How the BJP Wins: Inside India's Greatest Election Machine." In that book, which recounted the BJP's 2014 general election victory in many of its subsequent triumphs in a couple of its defeats in state elections between 2014 and 2017. You know, in hindsight, this appears to have been in extremely prescient. You know, you could not have predicted the future back then, but back in 2017 did you have a sense that 2019 would end in a second consecutive single party majority for the BJP and Narendra Modi?

Prashant Jha: 01:36 You know 2017 was a long year. If you remember Milan, the year began with UP and BJP's spectacular victory in UPI. And the book was based substantially based on that. And when I was covering the UP elections and when I saw the mandate in UP, I did think that these guys are coming back and there's no way you can stop them. But by the end of that year, you had the Gujarat elections. When the burden of five term anti-incumbency began to be visible. The roll out of the GST had an impact among BJP's own constituents. The impact of demonetization had become clear and as you entered 2018 some of the bypolls and the setbacks in bypolls became visible. So I think my own view changed and if I had taught in early 2017, the 2019 would be a cakewalk. By the end of 2017 I thought, they will come. They could, they're, they're probably best positioned to come back. They will definitely be single largest, but will they have a majority? I was not as sure by the end of that year.

Milan Vaishnav: 02:36 And that pretty much maps, I think the conventional wisdom in Delhi, wouldn't you say, is that people felt okay, they'll come back most likely, but not in the same way that they had before?

Prashant Jha: 02:46 Yeah. I think that that was the wisdom in that that just kept gaining ground to 2018 and culminate and that reached its ascent over the defeat of the BJP in the state assembly elections at the end of last year.

Milan Vaishnav: 02:57 So I just want to read some of the titles of pieces you wrote for the Hindustan Times in the run up to this general election. "The Emerging Modi wave in UP." "The Emerging Modi Wave in Bihar Among the Young." "The Modi appeal in Madhya Pradesh." "What drives PM Modi's appeal?" As you now know, you know, many are saying now with the benefit of hindsight that a Modi sweep was inevitable, but there were relatively few who confidently and publicly wrote that a sweep was likely before the results came out. You know, help us understand, given these titles of, you know, your reports from the field, what you saw on the campaign trail that allowed you to see something that was really not apparent to many, perhaps even most election observers.

Prashant Jha: 03:39 You know, I kept it simple. If once you're on the ground, you just listen and if you are talking to ten people and if seven of those ten people are telling you that they want Modi back as prime minister, that is a very high likelihood that Modi would return as prime minister when even those three who are not voting for Modi are motivated more by certain past loyalties to parties which oppose Modi rather than deep anger then you can see that the opposition to Modi is not as energetic as the support for him. And in UP particularly, what I could see was that the social coalition that the BJP had constructed was firmly in place. The social coalition consisted of upper castes that consisted of a range of backward community caste groups, and a range of Dalit sub castes. That social coalition had propelled the BJP to victory in 2017.

Prashant Jha: 04:32 There was an additional challenge this time the BSP and SP, Mayawati's Bahujan Samaj Party and Akhilesh Yadav's Samajwadi Party were together this time. But even with that, you could see that the BJP was in the race and BJP was putting up a formidable fight. The seats may dip, but they're not, they would not get routed. In Bihar. If in UP seven in ten people were saying Modi in Bihar eight in ten people were saying Modi and the two who were not were Muslims or Yadavs, and Muslims and Yadavs had been traditional supporters of the Rashtriya Janata Dal led by Lalu Prasad. So you could see that the other forces, the non-BJP forces were not able to expand their support. The BJP had its social coalition intact. And what was holding it together was Modi's appeal. So, so I just, I just reported what I saw.

Prashant Jha: 05:17 I must confess that I did not have the courage to convert what I could see anecdotally into the numbers that eventually it translated into, because we still, I think we're not sure whether 2014 was an aberration and we were still thinking in what clearly are outmoded categories of politics. And we were still thinking about the fragmented polity. We're still thinking about how seats would inevitably reduce in States where they had dipped, where they had peaked last time, but if you just went by the ground mood, I actually now think that there was no need to travel outside Delhi. If you'd just take public transport in Delhi and talk to thirty people, twenty out of thirty/twenty-five out of thirty people would tell you Modi. And these are people who are - and Delhi is a city of migrants. These are people who come from outside. So it's just voices from the ground that got reflected in those reports.

Milan Vaishnav: 06:01 Well, Prashant, let me push you on this little bit further. I mean, you know, why did so many of us miss the wave, right? I mean, this is a question that political scientists are asking. Journalists are asking. Lots of people are asking that. Even those of us who expected Modi to come back and I put myself in that category, but I did not certainly see this kind of mandate that it would, they would beat even 2014. What do you think we were getting wrong? What, what, what are the signs that we missing where we too trapped by history, by precedent by our own biases. I mean, you know, just reflect a little bit on what do you think were the blind spots?

Prashant Jha: 06:42 I think the answer lies in your question. I think it was a combination of all those three factors. One was we, I think there are many observers who were trapped by history and I don't exclude myself from that, but we were still thinking about the post-1989 normal of Indian politics where regional parties are and remained extraordinarily strong where a national party attaining a majority had only been a one time phenomenon, which was 2014. We did not think that this could happen again. I think the, the - and as I mentioned in the previous answer, I think the fact that the BJP had peaked in so many States in north India and west India. I don't think many people anticipated that they could replicate that performance and could not see that they could compensate for the inevitable losses in these States

Prashant Jha: 07:26 in regions where the BJP wanted to make a breakthrough. So they may be, they may have been willing to give a few seats to BJP in Bengal. Definitely not eighteen. A few in Odisha, definitely not eight. A few in northeast, definitely not eighteen out of twenty-five but could not see the expansion that the BJP had made in these. So I think it was that. It was also bias. You know, I think many observers and have to have a certain view of the BJP and tend to complete their analysis of BJP's prospects with their desire to see BJP defeated. And I think it's important to distinguish the two, you know, one can agree or disagree with the BJP, but when you are analytically or objectively just seeing what the ground situation is, it's important to step back and let your biases not come in the way.

Prashant Jha: 08:14 I think there was another reason which was that if you just looked at structural factors, particularly structural economic factors, it seemed like - that this was not the kind of governance record that the electorate would reward because there were very high expectations in 2014 and given the dip in growth rates, given the fact that unemployment persisted may have even grown given that there were a serious and very credible reports of agrarian distress. We know that farmer incomes dipped. These were factors that people picked up and said that look objectively, how can these guys get the same mandate?

Milan Vaishnav: 08:49 But Prashant, but they're not wrong. Right? I mean, those were objective facts.

Prashant Jha: 08:53 They were, but I think what in that process, I think we underestimated the power of some of some other factors which were also in play.

Prashant Jha: 09:01 And those factors included the kind of welfare delivery that the Modi government had been able to do on the ground. And I think the rural housing electrification,

Milan Vaishnav: 09:12 -toilets-

Prashant Jha: 09:12 toilet construction and gasoline does, I think all of it put together made Modi seem like an efficient, you know, administrator who had reached out to poor student citizens and given them goods and fulfilled their basic necessities. I think we also underestimated the impact of PM Kisan, which was only announced in the interim budget. It was a support of 6,000 rupees in three installments to farmers below a cert - who held land below a certain area -. And only 4,000 in some cases, 2000 in some cases, 4,000, actually got into the hands of farmers. But I think that that played a part in changing the optics and we underestimated many people underestimating the power of nationalism.

Prashant Jha: 09:58 I mean, clearly the national security narrative post-Pulwama and Balakot had a big role to play in projecting Modi as a strong muscular leader who had given Pakistan the response it deserves. And who had also in these past five years, quote unquote increased India's prestige worldwide. I mean, this is something that I heard a lot. No, and I think we just, just to sum it, I think we just underestimated the faith that people continue to have in Modi's intent and Modi's integrity. And the fact that he is seen as honest, the fact that he is seen as the most credible given that the opposition did not have a prime ministerial candidate of the same stature and, and a combination of all these factors. So I think it was this, that came together.

Milan Vaishnav: 10:43 But you know the one you didn't mention is that maybe we underestimated the bankruptcy or the emptiness of the opposition in terms of offering an alternative path forward.

Prashant Jha: 10:53 Absolutely. In hindsight, I mean, no, it's strange that even 12 crore people, 120 million people voted for the Congress because this was a party that you know, let me be fair. The party showed energy over the past year. They had had a decent manifesto. They brought out an income scheme, which was, which promised a 72,000 rupees per year. Rahul Gandhi was an energetic campaigner this time and he was not as much an object of mockery as he was the last time around. But this was a party where it's senior leaders we're seeing that our best cases tripling our 2014 performance.

Milan Vaishnav: 11:31 Which was 44 seats.

Prashant Jha: 11:32 Which was 44 seats. So why would you know if your aim is 120 seats and BJP's worst-case was 220 seats. I mean, why would a voter take you seriously?

Prashant Jha: 11:42 This was a party that was still reluctant to project Rahul as a prime minister. The, which was not clear whether the Congress would be in a subsequent government playing the role of an anchor as the leader or playing the role of a supplement of where it would be supporting the regional leader as a prime minister if the regional parties had done very well. So I think there was the two big issues that they picked up. I did mention the income support scheme, but the income support seemed scheme suffered from both the crisis of communication and a crisis of credibility. The scheme came too late, it did not reach the ground. And when it did reach the ground? Many people just did not believe it because the Congress party lacks credibility. And I had people tell me they did not give us seventy-two rupees in seventy years. Why would they give us 72,000 rupees? And the second big issue that Rahul picked up was Rafale. And it was very clear to anybody who was traveling on the ground. And I take no extra credit for it, which was the Rafale had zero traction. In out of the 2000 people I may have met or in the course of my travels for five months on the ground, I did not hear a single person. And I'll emphasize this, not a single person mentioned the word Rafale.

Milan Vaishnav: 12:48 Okay, Prashant, so you're one guy on the field, you're asking questions. The Congress party has a much larger apparatus. They had came from a very different calculation. They thought this was working. You would hear it from Congress party sources all the time that we feel that this "chowkidar chor hai" is actually resonating. But you disagree.

Prashant Jha: 13:05 I disagree completely. And I remember coming back and telling friends in the Congress party, I mean I wrote about it. And then I shared it with them that, look, I don't think this is working. And maybe they thought it was working because you know, when Rahul went to address rallies, it's important to remember he was addressing the of Congress supporters. These were people who were bused in by candidates of the Congress in that particular constitutency. So when Rahul said chowkidar, they said chor hai. And Rahul probably thought that, look, this is a mass slogan now. But of this may have been a slogan that resonated with the party core as it were, but it was definitely not enough. And it and it did not do anything to shatter the prime minister's image of integrity. In fact, the PM just picked it up and and, and started a nationwide campaign of mein bhi chowkidar, and he appropriated the word. It was classic 2014 where Mani Shankar Aiyar made this mistake of calling him chaiwallah. And he just appropriated chaiwallah and went back to his humble roots. This was not a mistake. This was a deliberate strategy of calling you know, pointing out that he was a chor. It was a direct allegation and he owned it and, and that resonated more than chowkidar chor hai.

Milan Vaishnav: 14:17 Well, you know, one of the things that you mentioned, Prashant, was efficient social service delivery. And I think of the, all the ex-post justifications or explanatory factors this is the one that you hear a lot of, especially among people within the BJP. Now the BJP is certainly not the first ruling party to have used social service delivery government schemes to move voters, but it seems to have done so way more effectively than its rivals. Why is that?

Prashant Jha: 14:41 I think it's a combination of two things. One, I think India's delivery mechanisms have improved over the last five years. Again, credit to UPA where it where it deserves it with Adhaar and with the idea of direct benefits transfer. In UPA 2 the seeds of this was sown. The NDA government ran with it and it used a, the Socio-Economic Caste Census in 2011 to make more target - to identify beneficiaries - it used Adhaar. It used direct benefits transfers. It used the fact that there was Jan Dhan accountsand therefore many more people had bank accounts to transfer funds directly. So I think there was an improvement in delivery mechanisms which help the BJP. The other point was that the BJP ensures that if they have done a something the targeted audience knows about it and this, they do through their party organization. In this they do through relentless propaganda and relentless media outreach. So I think the fact that Modi has delivered gas cylinders was something that was communicated every day in every campaign by every leader in every nook and corner of every constituency that the party was fighting in. And, and, and, and so one, they delivered better. And to the ensure that everybody got to know that the delivery happened.

Milan Vaishnav: 16:02 And even if the state governments had some role in it, it, the credit was being claimed solely by the party. And even if it's a BJP controlled state government, the credit still goes to Narendra Modi, who's the man at the center. Let me fast forward to the present day. I mean, it's so apparent just being here this week in Delhi where we're talking that the BJP enjoys complete dominance. You know, the Congress is in a state of free-fall. Opposition leaders from to Mamata to Mayawati are on the back foot. Have we entered a new political era which some analysts have called the second dominant party system. Can we say that now with confidence?

Prashant Jha: 16:40 I think we're good. I think we can. I know that Rajni Kothari coined the Congress system as a term in 1970 and this was after two decades, two and a half decades of uninterrupted Congress rule. And we're not there yet, but it was a different time. I think given, I think what we can say is that there is a new normal developing in Indian politics. That new normal is defined by BJP hegemony. The fact that the BJP has in the context of a more federalized polity than India had been in the sixties or fifties. In the context of this fragmented policy with so many caste based and regional based formations had emerged in the last 30 years are the fact that BJP has been able to come to power twice. And this time with a bigger mandate at the center and the BJP still controls the reigns of power in close to fifteen governments - state governments - and is looking set to replicate its a success in some of the state assembly elections, which are due at the end of this year.

Prashant Jha: 17:44 I think, can lead us, can get us to the conclusion that this is a dominant party system. And you know, there will be electoral setbacks. This is not to suggest that BJP's won't to lose elections in the future. They will. Now, this is not to suggest that regional parties are going to, this is not an obituary of regional parties. I think they're going to remain. This is also not to say that the Congress is going to just fade away as we discussed. They got 120 million votes. They will also be in, but I think they'll, for the foreseeable future, at least the next five to ten years, we are going to continue to see BJP as the dominant party

Milan Vaishnav: 18:17 You know, I think the point is even if victories/losses come and go, this system is being defined in relation to where you stand against the BJP or for the BJP. And that was one of the critical core tenants of the earlier Congress system, right, is that you would see waves four and wave an opposition to the Congress. I want to go back to your book for a second because one of the thing that you explained so beautifully is this unique partnership between the BJP party president, Amit Shah, and the prime minister, Narendra Modi. How would you, to a lay person, describe the division of labor between these two men? You know, and why has it worked so well? Just from a purely political electoral standpoint?

Prashant Jha: 19:00 Modi is the brand. Amit Shah is the man who ensures that the brand translates into votes and ensures that the very attractive brand is - and customers are attracted to that very attractive brand - go and finally buy that brand. So it's that he's, so while Modi has been the public face and, and make no mistake, this was Modi's election if it was not for Modi as the face in the BJP candidates locally had to fight this election, the BJP would've struggled to get 150. So this was Modi's election, but to ensure that that, that image that Modi has got translated into vote's through a robust organizational machine was what Amit Shah contributed. And I think that's the division of labor. So Amit Sh - Modi was, you know, Modi was happy to put in the hours. Modi was happy to talk about his governance record. Modi was happy to, you know, give strong polemical speeches whenever required.

Prashant Jha: 20:01 But Amit Shah would have a role in telling Modi where to go, which constituencies needed him most, which States needed him most. Where should the prime minister invest his energies in. Which constituencies needed what kind of resources? How should other party leaders be mobilized? Which were the swing constituencies which could come this way? I mean that kind of micro organizational work and, and ensuring that the parties you know, members, the parties booth committees were all operational, the party was not short of funds. All of that was I think largely to do with Amit Shah.

Milan Vaishnav: 20:36 So, we know there's a transition coming up. Amit Shah has joined the government as the Union Home Minister. It's already been announced that he will hand over the reigns of the party later this year, December, January to a new BJP president, J.P. Nadda. Is there a danger, given what you've just said, that politically things could hit a rough patch because this dynamic duo, as it were, is moving on to something else?

Prashant Jha: 21:02 I didn't - if J.P. Nadda has become the working President but the formal elevation that, you know, is still to be done. So, it's probably going to be him, but that requires this formal ratification, which has not happened as you said. I don't think Amit Shah is going to cede control completely. I mean, I think J.P. Nadda may be the president, but this is going to be a president who is not going to be entirely autonomous and he would happily defer to Amit Shah's you know, preferences when it comes to party affairs. So I think this is not going to be a conflictual relationship. But I think there's no, there is no doubt in anybody's mind in BJP now that if Narendra Modi is number one, Amit Shah is number two irrespective of the designation that he holds in the party. So J.P. Nadda would play his part in keeping the organization and machine rolling. But the big decisions will be taken by Amit Shah with consultation with Modi where its required.

Milan Vaishnav: 22:05 So, I mean, in other words, it's sort of a burden sharing agreement. Right? And Amit Shah has taken on new roles and he'll have someone who will...

Prashant Jha: 22:10 There is the one person, one post rule in the BJP, which why Rajnath Singh had left last time and Amit Shah had taken over. But...

Milan Vaishnav: 22:18 You've been a reporter covering north India for many years now. You know, some political scientists have written that in the aftermath of the elections that Mandal politics, right? The kinds of caste based social justice movements we saw in the wake of the Mandal commission in the late 1980s that's now dead. It's reached a political saturation point. Would you go so far as to conclude that from the a basis on these elections?

Prashant Jha: 22:41 And, and I'll answer that in two levels. You know, Mandal politics represented the assertion and the emergence of backward castes and their desire to seek space in the political structure. I think that remains. In that sense that that process that Mandal unleashed is irreversible and even the BJP has had to accommodate itself to Mandal politics. The fact that BJP today has become more of an OBC party than it ever was. The fact that from ticket, and this is reflected in the party appointments. This is reflected in the ticket distribution. This is reflected in the messaging. All of it shows that BJP has had to make peace with Mandal and has had to accommodate the forces unleashed by Mandal. So in that sense, Mandal is alive and will remain alive. But there was certain political forces that emerged out of Mandal, right?

Prashant Jha: 23:35 And the Samajwadi party in Uttar Pradesh or the Rashtriya Janata Dal in Bihar are some of the prominent examples. Now these parties began as wide umbrella formations. They began as parties of both the backwards, the Dalits. They ended up becoming a - they ended up constricting in form. They became a party from a party of subaltern to party of backwards to a party of their particular sub caste to a party of the family. And I think this election and the previous election probably marks to us the limits of that kind of politics. So I don't think SP with only others and Muslims, where even some of the others maybe defecting to BJP, or RJD with only Yadavs and Muslims - where again, Yadavs may be defecting to BJP - can survive in the form that they did for 30 years. They will have to reinvent, they will have to find a new language and vocabulary of politics, they will have to widen their social alliances.

Prashant Jha: 24:32 They cannot just bank on identity based grievances, the politics of resentment which was very legitimate at one point, but which is not gonna that's not gonna be enough.

Milan Vaishnav: 24:43 So, I want to end this conversation, Prashant, by asking you to reflect on some of the sources of vulnerability inside the BJP. We talked a lot about their strengths. We talked a lot about the opposition's weaknesses. But right now, you know, we're in a scenario where we're all forecasting BJP hegemony as far as the eye can see. Not forever, but for the foreseeable future. What are the stress points we can identify sitting here today, which could upset the status quo even if they don't materialize today or tomorrow or next month or next year. What are some of those things that remain challenges or contradictions or hurdles?

Prashant Jha: 25:18 You know, I'll point to two big social challenges. The first is that BJP has been able to get 303 seats, 220 million votes because people from every class of society have watered for BJP.

Prashant Jha: 25:32 It's the super rich, it's the rich, it's the middle class, it's the lower middle class. And it's the poor. So I think, and it's the poor and within the poor there is a hierarchy. So I think that the BJP has been able to in different degrees now when the votes of the multiple classes that populate India's complex class structure. Now, you don't have to be a Marxist to know that there is going to be inevitably a degree of caste class conflict in policy decisions. The, if BJP feels too strongly in favor of a, you know, a certain kind of economic paradigm which favors the corporates or the upper middle class that is going to be a and without compensated welfare benefits, that is going to be a backlash from the poor.

Prashant Jha: 26:20 If, if the BJP is seen as becoming only welfare-ist at the cost of growth at the cost of jobs at the cost of - without paying attention to these dimensions, I think there is going to be a backlash from a restive younger population. It may not have happened this time, but we just still looking for opportunities. So I, the one challenge I would, I would think that the BJP, may face is sustaining this class coalition. And the second is in terms of caste, the BJP has also been able to construct the caste coalition where it has won votes of every, almost every single broad caste formation from, from upper caste, within upper castes, different sub castes within the OBC community. Different sub castes, barring say some Yadavs in UP or Bihar. Or within Dalits also a substantial number of Dalits.

Milan Vaishnav: 27:12 And Adivasis also.

Prashant Jha: 27:12 And, yeah. Right.

Prashant Jha: 27:14 Absolutely. Tribals to a very large degree. So again, is it easy to sustain this? I don't think so. I mean, there are real contradictions even today on the ground in social relations between upper castes and OBCs, between our OBCs and Dalits, between upper castes and Dalits. We saw this last year, we saw this when the, you know, Supreme Court that diluted the provisions of the Prevention of Atrocities Act, there was a backlash from the Dalit groups. The government restored the provisions through an amendment. The upper castes then went against BJP for having betrayed them. And we saw electoral implications of this and Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan in the election. So in the state elections. So the WB was able to then neutralize it by bringing an upper class reservation or 10% upper caste reservation. But this requires, as you can see, constant balancing and this constant negotiation. BJP is good it, but at some point these contradictions will emerge. Politics abhors a vacuum. So I don't see now the dominance not being challenged in some form. It could be challenged from within, it could be challenged from outside. But I think these are the two big fault lines I would point to.

New Speaker: 28:21 The book is called "How the

Milan Vaishnav: 28:22 BJP Wins: Inside India's Greatest Election Machine" published in 2017 by Juggernaut Books. I encourage all of our listeners to get out a copy. It's probably the single best guide that's out there to understanding this version of the BJP, the BJP 2.0 under Narendra Modi and of course party president Amit Shah. Prashant, it's been a pleasure talking to you. Thanks for coming on the show.

Prashant Jha: 28:42 Thank you, Milan. Thank you for having me.

Milan Vaishnav: 28:46 The Grand Tamasha is a co-production of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Hindustan Times. You can find us on iTunes or wherever you get your podcasts. Don't forget to rate and review. It helps others find the show more easily. For more information about the show and to find the writing we referenced on this week's episode, visit our website GrandTamasha.com. Production assistance comes from Megan Maxwell and Rachel Osnos. Tim Martin is our audio engineer and Lauren Dueck is our executive producer. Thanks for listening and see you next week.