Ashley J. Tellis joins Milan to discuss the Biden-Modi summit, the Quad, and the future of U.S.-India relations.
This week, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrives in Washington for his first in-person meeting in the American capital with U.S. President Joe Biden. Modi, Biden, and the leaders of Australia and Japan will also be gathering for an in-person edition of the Quad Leader’s summit.
To understand what’s on the agenda and what it means for the United States and for India, Milan is joined this week by Ashley J. Tellis. Ashley holds the Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and is a senior fellow at Carnegie.
Milan and Ashley discuss the agenda for the coming Biden-Modi summit, turbulence in U.S.-India relations, and whether the Quad is paying dividends. Plus, the two speak about the impact of regime change in Afghanistan on India, on U.S.-Pakistan ties, and the future of U.S.-India cooperation in the region.
Intro Reel 00:00
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Milan Vaishnuv 00:12
Welcome to Grand Tamasha, a co-production of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Hindustan Times. I'm your host, Milan Vaishnuv. This week, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrives in Washington for his first in-person meeting here with US President Joe Biden. Modi, Biden, and the leaders of Australia and Japan will also be gathering for an in-person edition of the Quad [Quadrilateral Security Dialogue] Leader's Summit. To understand what's on the agenda and what it means for the United States and for India, I'm joined today by my colleague, Ashley J. Tellis. Ashley holds a Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and is a senior fellow at Carnegie, but perhaps most importantly for the purposes of the show, he is one of Grand Tamasha's most popular guests of all time. I'm very happy to welcome him back to the show. Ashley, thanks for taking the time.
Ashley J. Tellis 00:53
Thank you so much, Milan, for having me. I'm delighted to be back.
Milan Vaishnuv 00:56
So, since you were last on the show, we have had not one, but in fact several systemic shocks to the global system. We've had the onslaught of the Delta variant first in India [and] now in the United States, the election of a new American president, and the recent US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Let me start by asking you about the last one first, if you could just sort of describe for us what the Taliban takeover in Kabul means for India.
Ashley J. Tellis 01:24
I think there's no way to put a gloss on what is a very unfortunate outcome from India's perspective. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban takeover really represent a reversal for India along multiple dimensions. India had hoped that the US mission in Afghanistan would have been successful and that it would have been able to extinguish the sources of jihadism that are plaguing that region, and that the US essentially confronted [it] for 20 years. We have left with that job unfinished, and that has clear consequences for Indian security. There is another dimension that is important to recognize: India made big investments in Afghanistan over the last 20 years, economic and security. And those investments were made because India wanted to preserve an Afghanistan that was free of Pakistani influence. That objective, too, has failed. And now, I think India is beginning to confront a new reality that was only in its peripheral vision over the last 20 years. And that is: its most threatening adversary, China, now has ended up with a larger than life role in Afghanistan. And so when India looks at Afghanistan today and sees the combination of these factors of which the last, China's new role, is perhaps the most unsettling, there's no way that Indian security elites can conclude anything other than accepting that India's security has taken has taken a big hit.
Milan Vaishnuv 03:17
As you look ahead, what is Delhi's posture likely to be vis-a-vis the Taliban regime? Because in some sense, the Indian government is leading the charge globally against recognizing the regime. Yet, of course, there are very practical concerns about refugees, about the humanitarian crisis, [and] obviously, questions of cross border terrorism. So how is it going to balance these competing factors?
Ashley J. Tellis 03:43
So this is a challenge that will occupy Indian policymakers for at least the next few months, until there is clarity about how the global system responds to this new Taliban regime in Afghanistan. My suspicion is that they are going to be very pragmatic about it, and they're going to walk a tightrope. What is the pragmatism and what does the tightrope entail? The pragmatism involves keeping some lines of communication open to the Taliban leadership, particularly through the Doha connection. Because as you point out correctly, there are still thousands of Indians in Afghanistan. The whole future of India's development projects [is] still an open question and so on and so forth. But I think India wants to make certain that there is no rush to recognition and no rush to financial assistance.
Ashley J. Tellis 04:42
Of course, some assistance has to be provided on humanitarian grounds. But India does not want the international spigot open until it receives clear assurances from the new regime in Kabul that India's equities will be protected. And what does that mean? I think it means three things. First, that there will be no threat to Indian lives, both the non-official personnel that are present, as well as the official presence when it returns. That's the first assurance India would like. Two, India would want to make certain that the regime commits to not permitting Afghan territories to be used as a springboard for attacks against India. And third, I think India will want to find ways of ensuring that whatever cleavages exist between the Taliban in Pakistan, those cleavages actually expand rather than diminish. You know, [...] this is a hard challenge to overcome. But I think India is going to be cautious in what it does, and it's going to approach these with a certain measure of delicacy.
Milan Vaishnuv 06:04
Let me steer this conversation to the US-India relationship, because there have been several commentators in India who have sounded a note of betrayal in the op-ed pages, right? They are basically saying [that] the United States has hung Delhi out to dry by rapidly drawing down in Afghanistan. It has left this problem child on Delhi's doorstep. As you look out at the scene, how do you think the events of the past month, the last 30 days, have affected how Delhi views the bilateral partnership?
Ashley J. Tellis 06:35
So let me make two points there, Milan. I mean, first, in purely objective terms, we cannot deny that the US exit has had unfortunate, unintended consequences for India security. To that degree, I think many of the Indian complaints are right. But we have to emphasize the word "unintended" because, this was not done with malice aforethought. This was not done with the intention of making India's life more difficult. Rather, everyone knew that US policy was evolving in a certain direction, that the US was going to leave Afghanistan sooner or later. And of course, we wish the circumstances of the exit had been different. But what has happened has happened.
Ashley J. Tellis 07:24
And I actually sense a remarkable degree of sophistication on the part of the Government of India. The Government of India appreciates that this exit was inevitable. They are simply now looking to work with the United States in mitigating the long-term consequences of that decision. And so while unofficial, India is exercised about the United States. I think the government has been not only more restrained, which of course it has, but also been more sophisticated in its appreciation of what needs to be done. And so the conversations that have taken place, and there have been several conversations at the highest levels in the last several weeks, have really been focused on what do we need to now do together to mitigate the ill effect. What kind of cooperation between the two countries is still possible? And let's work together to develop a roadmap that allows both countries to get to where they want to go.
Milan Vaishnuv 08:27
And correct me if I'm wrong, but I have not seen any Indian official publicly criticize the United States move, Now privately they may grumble but the official government stance has not been to cast aspersions on the US withdrawal.
Ashley J. Tellis 08:44
That is absolutely correct. And I think it's partly because there was no strategic surprise, right? There was a tactical surprise in the way that the President pushed this, in the manner that it all came out. But strategically ever since the Trump administration, India recognize that the US was on its way out, and therefore had to devise some alternative backup plans of its own. So in that sense, this is not shocking, at least with respect to the broad outcome.
Milan Vaishnuv 09:17
So, we're speaking here just several days away from Prime Minister's first in-person visit with President Biden here in Washington, DC. Obviously, without a doubt, Afghanistan is going to be one of the most pressing agenda items. I'm going to ask you after this to elaborate on the Quad Summit [and] what might happen, but if you leave those two issues aside, what do you think are the other key discussion points for the bilateral visit between Modi and Biden?
Ashley J. Tellis 09:46
Well, I suspect there is going to be a long agenda because the bilateral relationship has really dramatically expanded in the in the last several years. I expect that China and the future of the Indo-Pacific will be an important element of discussion. Clearly, there's a Quad dimension to that, and we will see that conversation in the Quad. But even in the bilateral US-India relationship, there are issues of defense cooperation. There are issues of what the two countries can do with respect to intelligence sharing, and so on and so forth, that are connected to China. So, I expect that will be that will be important. The COVID pandemic has not been defeated in either country. And India has seen in the United States a very important partner in the global vaccine campaign. And so I expect that, you know, some discussion about when India can resume making vaccine contributions to the global effort will be on the agenda as well.
Ashley J. Tellis 10:50
This administration, in a sharp departure obviously from Trump's policy, has reaffirmed its commitment to climate change and climate mitigation. And I think there will be some serious conversations. We've had Secretary Kerry already go to India twice. There will be some serious conversations about what India proposes to do with respect to its own national commitments, particularly in the ramp up to to the Glasgow summit [2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference]. I expect that there will be other conversations with respect to civilian space, as well as to military space. We began those discussions already. The challenges of cyber security, which again, matter heavily to the United States and India, I expect will be on the agenda. And of course, that hardy perennial of the last two years, which is supply chain diversification, where India has big asks, and I think the US is willing to be supportive, but sometimes India's own domestic economic policies subvert that ambition. So, there is a huge agenda, I think, in the bilateral conversation, and we will see the joint statements that lay that out, I think, quite copiously.
Milan Vaishnuv 12:06
You know, Beijing has already been quite vocal and quite critical of this Quad Leader's Summit. It's criticized this meeting for creating further tension in the region, for provoking enmity between nations. Six months ago, the Quad leaders committed to a three-point action plan: cooperating on vaccines--which you mentioned--developing solutions to the climate crisis, but also putting together smart minds on all four sides to think through common approaches to critical and emerging technologies. Six months isn't a long time. But can you give us a report card, as it were? Have we achieved anything thus far in the last six months of this three-point plan?
Ashley J. Tellis 12:57
It's very hard to judge that from the outside. My own sense is that the achievements of that will actually be quite modest. We will have probably made the biggest gains with respect to the issues of technology and diversification. The issues of vaccines, at this stage, really hinge on the challenges India faces at home and when it can overcome them in order to make the contributions that we just discussed. But I think that focusing on those three pillars can miss what I think is the bigger issue. And the big issue is that the Quad has not only survived, I think it [has] become a highly durable part of the Indo-Pacific architecture. And it repudiates the Chinese claim early on, that, you know, this effort would dissipate like ocean foam. The fact that they have met, the four leaders have met virtually are now meeting in-person and will have commitments to meet again in-person, shows that this is a group of countries that is committed to maintaining the balances against China. And I take that to be actually the most important element of these of these discussions in the in the next few days.
Milan Vaishnuv 14:31
There's another country which has been nervous, shall we say, about next week's gathering, and that's Pakistan. And there are many people as you know—you've been a part of these conversations—who are speculating about what the future of the US-Pakistan relationship might hold, right? Because on the one hand, there are people who firmly believe the United States no longer has to cozy up to the Pakistani government because our troops are out of Afghanistan. So, the leverage that they may have had over us has diminished. However, there are some on the other side who say the exact opposite; that going forward, Pakistani cooperation is going to be vital if the US is to have any over-the-horizon capacity to address what I think are very real counterterrorism challenges in the region. On which side of this debate, do you sort of come down? How do you think about these two competing claims?
Ashley J. Tellis 15:22
I mean, I don't think there's any doubt that Pakistan once again, has enjoyed elevated [rapport]. Precisely because if we are going to stay in the counterterrorism business in Afghanistan, sheer geography is going to make Pakistan important. But the expectation that this will somehow lead to a return to the US-Pakistan relationship of the kind that we enjoyed in the Bush and Obama years, I think [...] that is completely mistaken. That kind of a relationship is simply not going to return. And the United States is going to be very careful about what it does with Pakistan and ensure that whatever it does with Pakistan does not undermine the fundamental importance of the bilateral relationship with India. And it's very telling to me that when a Pakistan's National Security Adviser Moeed Yusuf, for example, came to Washington several weeks ago, he could not [...] he did not go back [without] having achieved the two objectives that he came here for. One was to engineer a conversation between President Biden and Prime Minister Imran Khan—that has not occurred. And two, try to convince the American strategic elite and the US government that Pakistan is once again now in an axial position, and therefore deserves special treatment. Both those objectives are frustrated, and I think that is a very telling sign of where the US-Pakistan relationship will go.
Milan Vaishnuv 17:04
Do you think, on the first point, that's a mistake, Ashley, because some people say, like it or not, Pakistan is a nuclear armed nation. So not having a head of state call between Imran Khan and President Biden isn't actually going to do any good, because we have at the end of the day real security interest. So do you think this sort of stalemate, as it were, is sustainable?
Ashley J. Tellis 17:28
I don't think so. I mean, I'm not particularly upset by the fact that President Biden chose not to call other than the symbolic proprieties. The real question is: what would the President speak to Prime Minister Imran Khan about? I mean, it is so obvious to all those who have looked at Pakistan closely, that Prime Minister Imran Khan does not determine the destinies of Pakistan, either as a state or as a nation. The forces that determine Pakistan's destinies are behind the scenes. And it would be simply inappropriate for the president to be engaging the real power brokers in Pakistan at this junction. And so, I think he made the best call. Now, this doesn't mean that we haven't connected with Pakistan with various other levels, right? That engagement continues. But I think the President has made the right call.
Milan Vaishnuv 18:26
So, I'd like to come back to the China question for a second because this past summer, you and Evan Medeiros co-wrote a piece in Foreign Affairs that I think is well worth people reading, and we'll link to that, called "Regime change is not an option in China." And just to summarize the argument very briefly, you basically say the US strategy towards China has to focus on Beijing's behavior rather than its leadership. And I'm wondering if you could help tell us how do you analytically separate the two?
Ashley J. Tellis 18:59
Well, I think the piece was provoked in large measure by what we saw occurring in the last couple of years of the Trump administration, where the United States went out of its way to identify the Communist Party of China as the root cause of all Chinese evils. Now, I have no difficulty by accepting that thesis, that the Communist Party of China is, in fact, a highly distasteful entity. It is repressive, it leads an oppressive regime that is the source of many of China's evils. But I don't see targeting the regime as being either productive for the United States or particularly efficacious to our minds. The point really is to focus on Chinese behavior. And we were of the view that even if the Communist Party of China was not in charge, there is every likelihood that a rising China, even if led by a different kind of leadership, could be just as assertive and just as aggressive in a way that we've seen China be. And so, our emphasis was really to keep the focus on Chinese behavior rather than the character of the Chinese regime. And I hope the Biden administration does that. So far, they seem to be doing that focusing on behavior rather than on the regime itself. And I think that's really the way to go.
Milan Vaishnuv 20:31
Ashley, in the wake of the Afghanistan withdrawal a refrain that we are starting to hear again, it's not a new one but we're hearing it maybe more intensely from Delhi, is that America is still thinking about this Indo-Pacific construct as something that relates to what happens to India's East, while Delhi is imagining a much wider area of operation, which includes India's West, stretching all the way to the east coast of Africa. Do you think that in this administration we are seeing any signs or any evidence that the American view on this has evolved? And are we seeing any kind of greater convergence and in this view?
Ashley J. Tellis 21:16
Well, I think the US always had the view that the Indo-Pacific extended all the way to the to the east coast of Africa. In fact, even in the Trump years, you know, there were references made to that geography. And in recent times, you've had Secretary Austin [US Secretary of Defense] come out and say that quite clearly, that we [US] see the Indo-Pacific not simply beginning at the Straits of Malacca but going much further. But having said all, I mean, we have to admit that there is a difference in emphasis, and that difference in emphasis, in my view, is rooted in the differences in interests. For the United States, the biggest threats in the Indo-Pacific region, are manifested east of the Straits of Malacca. Various for India, the biggest threats in the Indo-Pacific region are those that materialize west of the Straits of Malacca. Now, there's no way we can bridge this reality. And so, to my mind, the challenge is that both have to be sensitive to where the burdens of threat lie, and both have to find ways to reassure the other that they recognize the challenges and are working collaboratively to meet them. But I don't want to minimize the fact that there is a difference in emphasis both in New Delhi and in Washington. I don't see that going away anytime soon.
Milan Vaishnuv 22:51
Let me ask you about another criticism that you sometimes hear, which is: okay, let’s take the Biden administration face value, that they do have a renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific, however described. But at the end of the day, you simply don't have the personnel in place to make it happen. You don't have an ambassador in India, you don't have an ambassador in China, you only recently got confirmed Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia. As somebody who has worked in the mission in Delhi, someone has worked in the United States government, to what extent is this lack of personnel, because of our own political bureaucratic machinations, an actual problem when it comes to implementing this President's vision?
Ashley J. Tellis 23:41
I think it is a very serious handicap […] you cannot say this strongly enough. It is a very serious handicap, and especially not having an ambassador in Delhi. Since most of the delicate interactions always take place face to face, I think [it] really is going to undermine many of the things that this administration wants to do. Now, of course, the United States is a great power. They have other means of communication. The personal relationship between the President and the Prime Minister is one such. The very good relationship that Secretary of State Blinken enjoys with External Affairs Minister Jaishankar is another. But as a practical matter, if you want to get things done, you have to be fully staffed both in DC and in Delhi. And the honest truth is that we are not fully staffed, at least for the moment, in Delhi. And until a few days ago, we were not staffed even in Washington. And so Assistant Secretary [of State for South and Central Asian Affairs] Lu will have his work cut out for him. He has a very good team. He has a very good team. But he does need a counterpart in New Delhi, and I really hope that our own politics will allow Ambassador Designate [Eric] Garcetti to go there sooner rather than later.
Milan Vaishnuv 25:11
Let me conclude this conversation by asking you about the prospects for the future, right? I think you and I, and most people who listen to this program, would agree that regardless of whatever current turbulence the relationship might be experiencing, because of recent events, the strategic logic of US-India relations still appears to be robust, right? But there are a number of people in both countries who are questioning the economic and/or political logics, right? We see a turn to protectionism in India. We see inequality here in the United States, and that has political and economic policy ramifications. And we see, of course, the common democratic struggles in both countries, in India and the United States. As someone who has implemented this relationship, has studied this relationship, guided this relationship for so long, how do you react to some of the skeptics who say that if you think about this relationship as having multiple pillars, several of them now are decaying or deteriorating?
Ashley J. Tellis 26:20
So, I take the deterioration and the threats of deterioration seriously. Because I think if you want to have a truly fecund relationship, we've got to be firing on all cylinders. If the economic leg is weak, if the leg about democratic solidarity is weak, then I think you're left with one single pillar. And that single pillar is essentially strategic convergence. Now, I hope that strategic convergence proves to be robust enough that it creates space for us to creatively and thoughtfully address our differences in the other areas. I hope that is the case. But it constantly worries me precisely because we are two complex democracy, two complex societies. With each of us with our own sort of sensitivities about how we deal with China, it really becomes important that we put these other pieces, or keep these other pieces, in good repair, if we have to make this relationship work. Ultimately, though, I'm optimistic for one reason: that the challenges posed by China are so significant and are unlikely to disappear anytime soon that it will give us enough potential energy as it works in the relationship that can be translated kinetically to some good outcomes. In many ways, in that sense, you know, China provides sufficient glue to keep us going. And the way Xi Jinping's China [...] is going, I don't see that glue disappearing anytime soon.
Milan Vaishnuv 28:03
My guest on the show this week is Ashley J. Tellis. Ashley holds the Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and is a senior fellow at Carnegie. I think he has proved he's considered one of the most, if not the most insightful scholar and expert on the US-India relationship. Ashley, on the eve of a prime ministerial visit, I know you're in high demand. So, thanks so much for sparing the time; it's always great to talk to you.
Ashley J. Tellis 28:24
My pleasure. Thank you Milan.
Milan Vaishnuv 28:27
Grand Tamasha is a co-production of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Hindustan Times. This podcast is an HT Smartcast original and is available on htsmartcast.com, India's fastest growing podcasting platform. You can also find us on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or wherever you get your podcasts. Don't forget to rate and review; helps others find the show more easily. For more information about the show and to find the writing reference on this week's episode, visit our website grandtamasha.com. Production assistance comes from Caroline Duckworth. Tim Martin is our audio engineer, and Cliff Djajapranata our executive producer. Thanks for listening. See you next week.
Outro 29:07
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