In Grand Tamasha's first episode of Season 6, Milan is joined by Avinash Paliwal to discuss the impact of Afghanistan's fall for India. The two also talk about the Taliban government, how Pakistan fits into the picture, and what the future of U.S.-India relations holds.
It’s been a month since the fall of Kabul and the sudden Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. In the intervening weeks, policymakers the world over have been scrambling to understand the reasons for the sudden collapse of the Afghan government, the real aims of the new Taliban regime, and the geopolitical implications of this crisis for the region AND for the world.
To kick off the sixth season of Grand Tamasha, this week Milan is joined by Avinash Paliwal to discuss what these developments mean for India. Avinash is a senior lecturer in international relations and deputy director of the SOAS South Asia Institute. His book, My Enemy’s Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the US Withdrawal, is one of the best guides we have to understanding India’s role in Afghanistan.
Milan speaks with Avinash about the notion of a “Taliban 2.0”, the composition of the new Taliban government, the divisions within the Pakistani establishment, and India’s back-channel talks with the Taliban. Plus, the two of them discuss what the crisis means for U.S.-India relations and India’s counterterrorism priorities.
Episode notes:
Milan Vaishnav 00:11
Welcome to Grand Tamasha, a co-production of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Hindustan Times. I'm your host Milan Vaishnav. It's been about a month since the fall of Kabul and the sudden Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. In the intervening weeks, policymakers the world over have been scrambling to understand the reasons for the sudden collapse of the Afghan government, the real aims of the new Taliban regime, and the geopolitical implications of this crisis for the region and the world. To discuss what these developments mean for India, I am joined by Avinash Paliwal. Avinash is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Deputy Director of the SOAS South Asia Institute. His book My Enemy's Enemy: India and Afghanistan from the Soviet invasion to the US Withdrawal is one of the best guides we have to understanding India's role in Afghanistan. Avinash joins me on Zoom today from London. Avinash, thanks for taking the time.
Avinash Paliwal 00:59
Thank you for having me here, Milan.
Milan Vaishnav 01:00
So, Avinash, before we kind of jump into the substance, I'd like to begin if I could just by asking about how you're absorbing these events in Afghanistan on a personal level? You spent so many years of your life studying [and] writing about Afghanistan. As you watched the images of Kabul falling and of Americans and so many Afghans frantically trying to exit the country, describe for us what was going on in your own head?
Avinash Paliwal 01:27
Milan, it's been very frustrating and scary, to be very honest with you, about what happened and the speed with which what happened in Kabul over the past few weeks. Everyone expected the Taliban to come into power in one shape or form, at some point in time. Not just because the Americans and the larger NATO forces wanted to leave Afghanistan and end what they call an endless war, but also because Afghans themselves, the people of Afghanistan, were quite fed up with unending mass violence. But I never expected the speed with which it fell. I never expected the optics of it to be really the worst case, nightmare scenario that everyone wanted to prevent it from being. That is what shook me[...]it's emotionally difficult to deal with. And I think this is something that will take time to process emotionally. Right now, like most other Afghans and Afghan observers, they're just trying to make sense of what has happened, but really feeling the impact of it, I think it will still take some time to really process and digest what has really happened. I firmly believe this is a strategic shock. Definitely for the region, the subcontinent itself, but perhaps maybe even a bigger strategic shock for Asia itself.
Milan Vaishnav 02:46
So, we want to get into all of those geopolitical implications not just for India, but for Asia. But before we do, let me ask you about a piece that you penned in the Hindustan Times. This was right after the fall of Kabul. In that piece, you wrote that the Taliban's resurgence "marks the geopolitical mainstreaming of fringe Islamists." We've seen a debate breakout all over social media in the op-ed pages between those who argue, "Look, we're seeing now a Taliban 2.0, which might have moderated some of its more extreme views." And then there's those on the other side who say, "Taliban 2.0 is basically Taliban 1.0 with better marketing," right? How do we think about the Taliban in the year 2021?
Avinash Paliwal 03:30
I do not subscribe to the view that the Taliban has changed in its core principles and ideology much, Milan. So, I firmly am on that side of the debate which says that Taliban 1.0 is not that different from Taliban 2.0. Yes, they are much more suave in terms of utilizing digital technology, low-end digital technology, but they have used it to consider the effect both in waging war and waging the psyops [psychological operations] operation really calibrated, not just by themselves, but also with support from their regional patrons and allies. Yes, this Taliban with new generation of fighters and new generation of leaders coming in [with] young people, young Afghans, coming in. They're much more adept at dealing with technology and that gives a veneer of moderation. Because the idea of Taliban in people's head was that they don't watch television, they don't listen to music. And to my mind, these are really kind of facetious parameters to guage the Islamist ideological quantities of any movement.
With anything, we would have done well for ourselves to learn the lessons from ISIS in the Middle East, Iraq, serially. They were very effective in using these modern tools. So, I don't see that Taliban has changed in how they want to govern and how they want to administer, in how they want to have a relationship with the people of Afghanistan[...]We can see that [in] the violent nature of the contract that is emerging between the Taliban in Kabul today and the people of Afghanistan. That really offers a good amount of evidence that there hasn't been much change.
Avinash Paliwal 05:17
Women’s voices are still being subdued. There is considerable violence against independent journalists. There is considerable violence against whom the Taliban thought to be their erstwhile enemies or who were part of the Afghan forces. In Panjshir, reports are coming in of crackdown against civilians. And that has not just been in the case of Panjshir, which has been iconized as a resistance, a citadel of resistance historically, which has finally been broken down.
Avinash Paliwal 05:29
So you can see that this movement is not really invested in change; this movement was invested in power. And the other aspect is that no such movement which comes to power after so much violence after 20 years of war, and which was forged during the Civil War in the early 90s, would have any reason to change. They came to power because of their Islamism, the cause of their radicalism. And that is something that they would not bleed themselves off once they have captured power in earnest.
Milan Vaishnav 06:21
So, you mentioned the Taliban as governors, right? After weeks of speculation, the Taliban has unveiled now the members of its cabinet. In response to a question from the Financial Times about what message these Cabinet picks sent to the west, you had this to say: "They don't give two hoots about the West. That's the message in the Cabinet picks.” Why do you conclude that?
Avinash Paliwal 06:42
They simply don't. Just look at the interim government [and] come to this question in a slightly different manner. There is this contradiction as far as the Taliban sits and where they would like to have certain degree of foreign aid and diplomatic recognition. From the West, they have been dealing with the United States directly diplomatically in the Doha process, but when it comes to how they want to run Afghanistan, and how they want to improve, they want to run Afghanistan from among themselves. That is not an issue on which the West broadly put has mercy. And I think that is the point which they very clearly wanted to convey. That yes, we [Afghans] want to deal with you [the West], but that does not mean we will dictate who you are dealing with and how you will deal how you deal with us.
Avinash Paliwal 07:32
And you can see that in the interim government set up that has emerged, right? You can see the contours of it, you have a lot of those figures who are still on the US terrorism list. From the Haqqani family and the larger network, you can see many of the senior leaders of former Guantanamo Bay prisoners, you can see that a lot of these figures are really hardline; they are the figures which the United States and its allies, including India, would have liked to see marginalized in any sort of an interim government. And the governments that have been something that is more inclusive in the sense that it has wider ethnic participation. It has wider, even within the Taliban, [...] representation of moderates in real power roles, rather than just being there as, you know, the doubt and without real power in the hands of the deputies. And that has not happened.
So, I think that is the message in many ways: that you will see hardline Islamists come and run this country, even though we know that you don't want to, you will have people who are in United States terrorist lists and under sanctions, who will be part of the government structure. How you deal with them is really your decision, not our problem. And I think that's a very consequential message to send, regardless of whether the Taliban wants to have entities which tomorrow would perhaps be capable of, or willing to, target the United States homeland as such.
Milan Vaishnav 09:07
[...] You've argued that the Taliban's victory is the "strategic win," so to say, that Pakistan has long desired, right? But you also point out, and I found this to be quite interesting, that Pakistan's official thinking, including within the military, remain somewhat divided about the Taliban, which I thought was quite intriguing. Tell us a little bit about how you see what those divisions are and how they might manifest?
Avinash Paliwal 09:33
I see the debate within Pakistan security establishment planning broadly along two lines. One is the body of opinion, perhaps you can say, which has much more salience within the hardline factions within the ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence], rather than certain sections of the corps commanders which is much closer to, let's say, Islamist worldviews, right and former Lt. General Hamid Gul, the former chief of ISI, so who is considered to be a very powerful, a very important figure in giving a fillip to regional Islamists. See, he kind of comes to epitomize that stream of thought within the Pakistan security agencies. And then there is another, much more nationalist, so to say, school of thought which believes that even though Taliban have served Pakistan strategic ends, in terms of clearing Afghanistan of Indian presence, in terms of creating a government which is much more friendly towards Pakistan, or at least dependent on Pakistan, as we can see today, there is a serious concern that they're also Islamists, and they will give much more political empowerment or encouragement to Islamists within Pakistan.
Avinash Paliwal 10:36
They have very strong links, familial links, economic links, logical links to the mother cell networks. And there is a risk of Pakistan actually losing leverage or losing the control that they have built very, very meticulously over the past two decades over this movement. Now that it's already operating out of Afghanistan. And the control mechanisms have kind of degraded; ISI central mechanisms over them have degraded if not disappeared. Concern within the Pakistani security establishment is voiced much more by Pakistani nationalists who don't see themselves or the country itself as some sort of radical Islamist safe haven. They don't want […] Pakistan's political fabric shift further to the Islamic right. And that is the risk that Pakistan runs with Taliban in power in Kabul. That's why I also noted in that there is a concern about this victory being a Pyrrhic victory, that you did get what you wanted, you don't have your regional powers in Afghanistan, but the establishment in Afghanistan might actually empower those elements in your own society, in your own polity, which will threaten Pakistan's insecurity in the coming weeks.
Milan Vaishnav 12:05
So let's move a little bit further east coming to India. Tell us a little bit of how Delhi is reacting to the latest news on the ground. What outreach have Indian officials had since August 15 with the Taliban? And how do you think Delhi is viewing this very thorny question which many governments are trying to work over about whether or not to recognize this new government at all?
Avinash Paliwal 12:28
So as far as India is concerned, let me go back to January 2010, before I actually come to August 2021. And I think this Taliban dial-in, or what to do with the Taliban, has been a central feature of India's Afghanistan policy, right from 1996 when Kabul fell for the first time to the Taliban. That is the point when India decided very clearly not to engage with the Taliban. Forget diplomatic recognition, even the kind of back channels that we know exist today were not existent at that point in time. And the full brunt of that was borne by the Indian policymaker during the 1999 IC 814 hijack, where an Indian airline was hijacked, taken to Kandahar, and that led to the release of some really hardened militants who were [impounded] in Indian jails: Pakistani militants essentially.
Avinash Paliwal 13:22
So I think that experience shook Indian policymakers to a considerable extent and made them realize that they cannot let go of the Pashtun lands, so to say, like both in the east and the south of Afghanistan, completely untouched. Just because they have the support of the resistance in the north, and the west at that point in time, [it] did not really help them with the hijacking incident. And since 2002, when India went in on the back of the security guarantees that were on the offer […] against an intervention, they really went and started to cultivate relationships with people in the Pashtun areas. A lot of the developmental projects went in there, small and big. 2010 is a moment when, for the first time, [the] idea of talking to the Taliban got baptized internationally in the Lancaster House Conference in London. And this is a moment when India is really concerned that Pakistan will be put in a driver's seat in this whole process, marginalizing or sidelining Indian concerns. That has been India's talk, a back channel, a covert conversation with the Talibs for the first time in earnest.
Avinash Paliwal 14:28
Since then, till now, both sides have been talking on the back, but they never really let this conversation develop because there was hardly any political appetite in New Delhi to entertain it seriously. And also, for the Taliban, the problem was that if they would be seen in the open talking to the Indians, they will have a huge cost to pay in the relationship with Pakistan. I think this is the central dial-in as India is concerned and perhaps India is an outlier in this case the [unintelligible] much more acute, both for India and for the Taliban, simply because of this India Pakistan enduring rivalry.
Avinash Paliwal 15:10
As of now, since 15th of August, [India's] decision has been taken and done. We want to talk to the Taliban, there is no dial in on that one. Yes, in media, there is a whole lot of debate on whether India should talk to them, whether India should not talk to them, meritorious arguments being offered from both sides. But the policymakers have taken a call—a very clear call—that we cannot afford to let that space remain untouched, we have to have some sort of channel with the Taliban. And we have, if you look at the recent past three [or] four weeks, the signaling that is happening. It is the Indian government, which had first leaked information of outreach. And then it was the Indian government, which also kind of formally acknowledged that they met with Taliban in Doha in the recent outreach when Ambassador Deepak Mittal met with some Taliban figures in the Indian Embassy in Doha.
So very clearly, India is showing that it is ready to own a channel publicly with the Taliban. But the Taliban, since the first leak happened, has never made a statement about its outreach to the Indians. They would say that they met the Chinese, they would say they met Russian officials, UN officials, German officials, but would never acknowledge that they have met Indian officials. Two Taliban figures, Abbas Stanikzai or Mullah Baradar, all who were seen as those who were talking to India through Doha, assured some degree of autonomy, so to say, in terms of the relationship with Doha, having complete marginalized in the interim government, especially after the visit of the ISI chief to Kabul, Faiz Hameed’s recent visit.
Avinash Paliwal 16:45
So, you can see the dynamic play out very clearly. I think, right now, as far as a meaningful conversation between the two entities is concerned, the ball is truly in Taliban's court rather than that of India. India has actually offered its hand. And I would not be surprised if India takes up the opportunity to offer some humanitarian aid to Afghanistan in the coming months. As far as the question of recognition goes, I think India will be the last to come on board with that decision. It's a hugely consequential decision. I think the two sides will have to do a lot of talking. And the Taliban will have to demonstrate something in practice, that they are keeping their promises of not letting anti-India or other global jihadis operate from their country without some meaningful give on that count from the Taliban side. I do not foresee New Delhi kind of offering that kind of diplomatic recognition, even if some sort of a channel is open and assisting to a limited degree.
Milan Vaishnav 17:46
So let me try to bring a couple of different strands together here. You know, New Delhi has long feared that the day the Americans exit, the Taliban would eventually take over, maybe not as quickly as they did, but they would come back to power and Pakistan and its proxies could then declare victory and sort of act with impunity. With regards to the terrorism question, which I think is probably first and foremost in the minds of many ordinary Indians, how worried should they be that insurgents will now turn their attention from the battlefield in the West and shift toward the East in places like Jammu and Kashmir?
Avinash Paliwal 18:24
India's counterinsurgency grid, with all its complications and all its problems, as far as India's relationship with the people of Kashmir goes—and that's a very complicated relationship—it's not a straightforward issue itself, right? But that's, if you keep PoK [Pakistan-occupied Kashmir] aside for a moment, the counter insurgency grid is very effective. And it is very difficult, not just for outsiders, or militants who are crossing borders who are Pakistani, or from any other countries to come into Kashmir and operate even for local militants, it's become very difficult to operate with impunity within Kashmir, given how strong India's counter insurgency grid actually is. So, I'm not personally very worried about suddenly there will be an uptick in infiltration that India cannot handle. I think that's something that both policymakers in Rawalpindi and in New Delhi understand that this is not going to translate into some heavy inflow of cross border militants into Kashmir that will change the larger military calculus of the region.
Avinash Paliwal 19:24
But the win of the Taliban has a psychological impact on those figures who are already there, right? There are many people who will feel emboldened that the Taliban can defeat a superpower in Afghanistan and perhaps we can also, however fruitless it might [...] be or however ineffective those endeavors might be militarily. We [domestic militants] should also take up arms to counter Indian "occupation" of Kashmir in the mountains[...] It's a political question much more than a military question. The other thing which I would like to also address on that issue [...] the question of the minorities and treatment of minorities in India. I think that is something that this moment does bring to the fore. You cannot isolate or you cannot have a substantial religious minority of your country feel alienated for a prolonged period of time, given the forces that have just reemerged to your West. We have seen in the past, there were people who were being recruited from different Indian states, including many South Indian states, such as Karnataka, Kerala, and Andhra, who would go and join ISKP [Islamic State Khurasan Province] in Afghanistan. This is pre-fall of Kabul on 15th of August. So there is a trickle at least of such Indian nationals being alienated and joining these movements. I'm not saying that this would turn into a mass movement. But the fact is that there is a problem within India that needs to be addressed. And there is a source which can be exploited much more today than it could earlier. And that is something that Indian policymakers across party lines must think about very carefully about what they're dealing with.
Milan Vaishnav 21:11
So let me push you little further on this because you had praise for the government of India's decision to open up a new E-visa category for Afghans seeking to take refuge in India. But there has been a lot of domestic churn, as you know, some people saying "Well, we should provide more favorable access to Hindus and Sikhs," some others saying "no, no, no, this should be kind of religion blind." At the end of the day, do you expect the government to take in large numbers of Afghans? Not only those who might have helped India, but other refugees or asylum seekers who are just looking for an exit?
Avinash Paliwal 21:53
Yes, I do. At least I hope that the Government of India does. The fact is that the numbers are not that big, including Afghan minority communities from Afghanistan—the Sikhs and Hindus […]—and not all of them left the country and some of them wanted to leave but not successfully evacuated. But yes, I appreciated, I supported India's decision to open that E-visa system in context of the fall of Kabul, across faiths, for whoever from Afghanistan wants to come, simply because the Afghan diaspora in India has been a very essential part of India's not just [...] in socio cultural context. But also, in a strategic sense. These are the kind of Afghans who enabled India's access in areas of Afghanistan, which would have been difficult for Indian officials on the ground to access and they offered India eyes and ears where India had none or could have had none.
Avinash Paliwal 22:58
There is a very clear, strategic value to diaspora apart from just the fact that you should have an open-door policy towards people who have been prosecuted, towards people who are trying to flee prosecution of ethnic conflict. But that sense of my appreciation came in that context, the fact that you're not focusing only on Afghan Sikhs, only on Afghan Hindus, despite the controversy around the Citizenship Amendment Act, which very clearly says that you have a partisan favoritism towards minorities, to me at that point in time was a ray of hope. Now, I was also proven wrong after a few days later, right? That, yes, in principle, you have shown this signal, your appetite, to accommodate Afghans across faiths. But the fact is that you didn't deliver on that; the portal didn't work. Many of the visas that Afghans were given in hard copy, which were left in Afghanistan, will cancel at some point in time. And the numbers that you evacuated were small.
Now I acknowledge that India did not have control over the situation at the Kabul airport, not many countries did. So that does create a very powerful, practical kind of hindrance of evacuating. But regardless of that, the fact that not enough visas have been processed either is another kind of issue that could have been addressed in time and substantially. So clearly, the signal was valuable. The signal was politically potent at that time. But India failed to deliver on that issue, as well.
Milan Vaishnav 24:30
As you look ahead, Avinash, you know, one of the most interesting questions to me is how regional stakeholders are going to respond to developments in Afghanistan. And I'm wondering if you could help us think through what options India has in terms of working with others in the region, not just to influence the Taliban in Kabul, but also to ensure that it has friends who are going to help it look after its own counterterrorism and security equities. What is the regional picture with some of the Central Asian states, with some of the other countries like Iran, vis-a-vis India looking after some of its own national security interests?
Avinash Paliwal 25:06
I think there is likely to be a two-pronged approach on this issue, Milan. One would be talking to Pakistan. That's one of the most important aspects which we often don't discuss that much, because it's all always assumed that India and Pakistan are compulsively at odds with each other on Afghanistan. I think, given that Pakistan is now much more confident about its own position in Afghanistan and [...] its relationship with the world at large, I think there might be a lenience of tactical cooperation between the two sides as to what extent they will accept India to be there, under the conditions.
Avinash Paliwal 25:48
Of course, this is something that New Delhi would not like. But this is the kind of conversation I would expect to happen in back channels that always happened between India and Pakistan. I think, today, Pakistan would be much more amenable to discussing Afghanistan with India than it was for the past few decades. I think that would be one approach wherein India and Pakistan will try to assuage their own bilateral issues, and the result of which we might see inflammatory or the other, in Afghanistan. And I think that will likely be the case, especially if Pakistan feels an increasing sense of threat from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Now that India is not there, they cannot blame India and the consulates for their national insecurities emanating from Afghanistan. And I believe that the consulates were a bogey, which has now been betrayed. It's the fact that without the consulate, also, the attacks keep on happening, shows that this is a much more endogenous problem to the region than India giving money to some groups here or there, right?
Avinash Paliwal 26:53
[...] I foresee some sort of conversation going on between India and Pakistan, perhaps not meaningful, but I think some sort of tactical cooperation might emerge which both countries will see as to being [in their] good interest, as they did to some extent in the early 90s, during the [Afghan] Civil War. The foreign secretaries of the two countries at that point in time to actively discussing Afghanistan, just to figure out some sort of modus vivendi, instead of fighting it out between the two. The other thing is [that] would be a reasonable approach: India has invested considerably in its relationship with Iran, especially on the Afghanistan question with Iran and Tajikistan. These are the two countries which India has dealt with very closely [...] India has outreach there, India has infrastructure there, that it can utilize it as an air base, there are a few hospitals, a history of hospitals in Tajikistan, and the [Imam Khomeini airport] that India has invested in Iran. I think these are the kind of assets that India can utilize in regional concert, to either deliver humanitarian aid to different parts of the country, in coordination with the Iranians on Central Asians, but also, if need be at a future point in time, if things go down really south, to see or to explore if these connections can be used in a security sense. I do think that the Iranians and the Tajiks are not particularly happy with the interim government that has been formed. They have razed it diplomatically; they don't have the military muscle to change it. But I think they can be powerful spoilers, as far as the Islamists sitting in Kabul at this point are concerned.
Avinash Paliwal 28:36
And I think, if India is unable to have any access to Afghanistan, which is acceptable to the leadership of the Taliban, and they can deal with that kind of Indian presence without jeopardizing the relationship with Pakistan. If that does not happen, I think we will see a much heavier reliance of India on allies such as Iran and Tajikistan who are very keen to ensure that Islamists don't spill over and will take perhaps a much more proactive security role in this region. And of course, that regional approach will be coordinated with the great powers, right? I mean, you can see India hosting the BRICS summit, to discuss regional security concern, you can see the National Security Adviser of India, a very powerful figure, Mr. Ajit Doval, talking to his British, American, [and] Russian counterparts, and discussing the logistics and the tactics of what's next. Not just evacuation and refugee flows that might happen, but what about the security issues that will come, that will 100% emerge, from Afghanistan in the weeks and months to come.
Milan Vaishnav 29:39
So Avinash, I want to ask you to kind of conclude this conversation about the future of US-India relations here in Washington. We're expecting Prime Minister Modi to show up in a few weeks and have his first person to person meeting with President Biden. We're already starting to see columnists, people writing in Indian newspapers, questioning the Modi government's decision to embrace the United States so closely, right? And there seem to be two points they're making: the first is that the Americans have basically given India's enemies a major victory right at their doorstep and number two the Americans have worked alongside their Afghan friends and allies for 20 years. And if this is how they treat them at the end of that, what’s to stop them from treating India in such a dismissive way at some future date if strategic calculations in Washington change. I'm wondering if you could just reflect a little bit on what this crisis means not for the here and now of US-India relations, but more kind of over the medium to long-term.
Avinash Paliwal 30:43
Milan, the Indian reaction demonstrates this historical duality between the US-India relationship. Within a piece from the Indian perspective, there is a sense of unease with which America conducts strategic affairs and conducts foreign policy in Asia, wherein it comes in very heavily when it sees [to] its own national interest, but masquerading it as a global agenda, and then leads also when it views that to be in its national interest, and also masquerades that as a global agenda. And that's something that is happening when the Americans came in 2001. It was a global war on terror. And now when the Americans are leaving, it's the Indo-Pacific that they want to focus on. It's the great competition with China that they want to focus on.
Avinash Paliwal 31:37
The method of the withdrawal is, I believe, the primary source of concern in India. There was an expectation that that the Americans would not stay there forever. But no one expected the situation to look like this, as it is right now. [...] The method of the withdrawal feeds into a historical sense of mistrust that I would say [...] it's historically salient for independent India, that that sense of not trusting the Americans, it's coming back. But at the same time, you also see those Indian policymakers and the same columnists who say that to criticize the Afghan withdrawal also acknowledge that India cannot operate without American support, especially given the competition that it is caught in with the Chinese. There is a sense that you cannot let them [Americans] go, but don't trust them beyond the point either. And I think that's a very uncomfortable position for any policymaker to be. Who is your ally? How far can this ally really go? Right? And what can we do? If this ally turns its back to us when we need this ally, to come and support us. There is very good argument to be made that the Americans supported India in the Eastern Ladakh crisis with China over the last year or so. Right? It has supported India very actively in the Indian Ocean region, keeping the tabs on Chinese movements and technological developments. And it is also helping India in international institutions like the United Nations on these issues.
Avinash Paliwal 33:11
But is that enough? [...] I think the other aspect of India's reaction is how do you envision the Indo-Pacific, right? Does the Indo-Pacific really begin from India's East onwards, all the way to Korea, or just about Taiwan or Southeast Asia? Or do you include Af-Pak [Afghanistan-Pakistan] in the Indo-Pacific? [As for] the constructs for India, its West is as important as its East. And here is a classic mismatch for the Americans. It's more about India's East rather than India's West. [...] That's where there can be a lot of friction moving forward. How do you reconcile India's very potent regional agenda which cuts across both its West and East, whereas the United States, which is very much focused on a larger grand strategic region of the Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia? I think that will be a tough conversation for both sides to have and I think that's perhaps what is pushed a lot of Indian decision makers to rekindle the conversations with the Russians, and perhaps figure out with the Chinese what could be possible modus vivendi between these two countries without completely jeopardizing the relationship between India and US. So I think that's the duality that we are seeing in play. And the debates got quite acute in the context of the Afghan withdrawal.
Milan Vaishnav 34:35
My guest on the show this week is Avinash Paliwal. Avinash is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Deputy Director of the SOAS South Asia Institute. There are many people who comment on Afghanistan, but few people who know it as well and can speak about it with such thoughtfulness as you have been Avinash. We are really delighted to kick off this new season of the podcast with you. You are in great demand right now. Thank you so much for taking the time out to speak with me today.
Avinash Paliwal 34:59
Thank you, Milan. It's an honor for me to be here.
Milan Vaishnav 35:03
Grand Tamasha is a co-production of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Hindustan Times. This podcast is an HT Smartcast original and is available on htsmartcast.com, India's fastest growing podcasting platform. You can also find us on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or wherever you get your podcast. Don't forget to rate and review; it helps others find the show more easily. For more information about the show, and to find the writing reference on this week's episode, visit our website grandtamasha.com. Production assistance comes from Caroline Duckworth. Tim Martin is our audio engineer and Cliff Djajapranata is our executive producer. Thanks for listening. See you next week.
Outro 35:44
This was a Hindustan Times production brought to you by HT Smartcast.